McClatchy interviewed small businesses, and was suppressed to hear that they are not complaining about being overly-regulated. Rather, they complain about the cost of insurance, the uncertainty of the market and, in the case of brick and mortar stores, the brutal competition caused by the internet. McClatchy did not hear from small business owners that government regulations were killing jobs.
At Slate.com, Eliot Spitzer argues that the BP disaster and the Wall Street disaster have something in common:
The law of incentives is what links the Wall Street cataclysm and BP's ongoing eco-disaster: In each case, we socialized risk and privatized gain, creating an asymmetry that created an incentive for private actors to accept and create too much risk in their business model, believing that at the end of the day, somebody else would bear the burden of that risk, should it metastasize into a disaster.
He mentions the astounding fact that in their current risk analysis of the too-big-to-fail banks, the Wall Street agencies assume that the federal government will come to the rescue with future bailouts. What we have is amazing. Public risk and private gain don't begin to pass the smell test. We are doling out corporate welfare where it is not needed and where it is not in the best interest of the taxpayers. And somehow, this catastrophic system passes as "the free market" among many modern-day free market fundamentalists. Spitzer points out that there are two ways to deal with businesses that engage in dangerous activities, tort liability and regulation, and that the public will be protected only if we have at least one of these.A regime of full tort damages and recoveries is one way to balance safety and exploration, or investment and risk, or whatever economic activity we are discussing. But there is another way: meaningful and vigorous oversight to impose safety standards that are dictated not by the market for insurance but by the judgment of serious experts in a regulatory context.
From across the political spectrum, voices are warning that it's business as usual for the big banks. They are still too big to fail (or even bigger) and strict regulation is a pipe dream.
Dan Smolin asks a good question: Why should we assume that the SEC's Mary Schapiro will make a U-turn in 2009, given that Schapiro has spent her entire career inviting brokerages to "self-regulate" and doing everything in her power to keep consumers at bay when they are ripped off and kept in the dark by brokerages? The easy answer is that we shouldn't assume that Schapiro will all of a sudden go to bat for the consumers. After all, Schapiro "has been at the very center of a failed regulatory process for the past two decades." We know where her loyalties lie, just like we know that Tim Geithner will never turn hard against Wall Street to clean up the corruption (see here for more details on Geithner--and here). Truly, years of actions speak much more loudly than months of words for both Schapiro and Geithner. I am convinced that Obama doesn't have the horses he needs to clean up Wall Street corruption. It's a typical modern conundrum where you need a highly motivated powerful outsider to get the job down, but there simply aren't enough highly motivated powerful outsiders. If Mary Schapiro had even an iota of interest in protecting consumers, Smolin wouldn't be needing to advocate for the following changes he is now pushing--they would have been a reality years ago:
1. Abolish the mandatory arbitration system and give investors back their constitutional rights;
2. Abolish "self regulation" by FINRA, which is a sham. The brokerage industry should be regulated by a governmental authority with the power to do so effectively. The SEC would be the likely agency to do so, with the right leadership;
3. Require brokerage statements to:
(a) Disclose the risk of every portfolio, as measured by standard deviation; (b) Compare the returns of every portfolio to a portfolio indexed to benchmarks of comparable risk; and (c) Disclose the "cost equity" of the portfolio, which is the amount the investor must make to break even, after payment of commissions, fees and margin interest. Common sense, right? Why aren't these reforms a reality? Good question. And why is a terribly motivated person like Mary Schapiro still sitting there pretending to be a reformer?
TMP has presented a terrible, yet not surprising, description of the enforcement arm of the SEC. Based on this detailed description of this dyfunctional enforcement arm, no wonder securities fraud has been running rampant. Oh, and on a related note, Huffpo reports that:
The inspector general tasked with overseeing and auditing the Federal Reserve knows pretty much nothing about what the Fed is doing. . . . She did not know where the Fed has invested its $2 trillion on the liability side of the balance sheet. "I do not know. We have not looked at that specific area at this particular point on," she said.