moral behaviors are typically the product of multiple levels of moral functioning, and are usually energized by the "hotter" levels of intuition, emotion, and behavioral virtue/vice. The "cooler" levels of values, reasoning, and willpower, while still important, are proposed to be secondary to the more affect-intensive processes.
Haidt has used the metaphor of an intellectually-nimble lawyer riding on top of a huge emotion-permeated elephant to illustrate his counter-intuitive approach, suggesting that the small articulate lawyer on top often lacks meaningful control over the elephant. Moral judgments are usually dominated by emotions such as empathy and disgust (the strength of these is represented by the big-ness of the elephant). In short, Haidt is quite sympathetic to David Hume's suggestion that moral reasoning is essentially "the slave of the passions."
In the March 25, 2010 edition of Nature (available here), Paul Bloom expressed concern that something important has been left out of Haidt's model. In reaction, Haidt defended himself against Bloom’s attack (see below), indicating that Bloom (whose work Haidt admires, for the most part) has misconstrued Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Model. I believe that summarizing this exchange between Haidt and Bloom sharpens the focus on the meaning of Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Model.
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One of the biggest mistakes one can make when trying to figure out people, in my opinion, is to assume that conscious thoughts in the form of words do most of the work of cognition. I believe this has it upside down, and that 90% of the engine our cognitive engine is not available to consciousness--it is subconscious and not available for introspection. It is a huge foundational mistake to ignore Freud's recognition that a large and powerful portion of the mind is not conscious. This is an especially important thing to note for those who cling to the notion that they can explain human behavior on the basis that it is generally rational. This mistake is compounded by the fact that humans are exquisitely good at confabulating, both consciously and unconsciously. We drum up ex-temporary reasons for our decisions post facto. We don't really know why we do the things we do but we brashly claim that we do know why we do the things we do.
In the special "Origins" issue of Discover Magazine, evolutionary anthropologist Michael Tomasello discusses some of his findings based upon his most recent book, Why We Cooperate. The article is not yet available online.
The author of this article (Carlin Flora) opens her interview with Tomasello by pointing out that the vast majority of projects done in today's world are done in collaboration with others. What makes humans such collaborative beings?
Actually, willingness to collaborate is a quality that clearly separates us from the other great apes, says Tomasello. He argues that the reason we cooperate so well with each other is our deep desire to help others and work with them toward shared goals. He was startled to find the degree of the "natural tendency" of young children (aged 1 to 3 years old) to cooperate with each other, but also to demand that newcomers to a group follow the rules of their games.
Tomasello sketches out what he thinks is the origin of cooperative behavior
I think cooperative behavior started with obligate collaborative foraging, which is just a fancy way of saying that we need one another's help to get food. If we have to work as a team to get food, all of a sudden you're really important to me, and I am motivated to make sure you get your fair share so the you will want to team up again. Were interdependent.
Tomasello argues that the "second booster rocket of our evolution of cooperation" was the development of social norms-agreements about how to act.
Humans have conformity norms. In our studies we will show a kid how a game works, and then we'll have a puppet come in who plays the game wrong. The children will say "no, no, no! This is not how you do it! You do it like this!" But conventions apply only to "us" in the group; it is "we" who prepare our food in this way and dress in this way. It's part of our identity that we do it like this. In contrast to those people on the other side of the river; they talk funny, they dress funny, the discussing things and we don't care whether they behave in this way are not.
How powerful is the human instinct toward cooperation? "We conduct our wars with armies that are highly cooperative." The big question for Tomasello is whether we can scale up our willingness to cooperate, which evolved in small groups. We haven't completely ruined the world yet, and "we are still here."
The arrows of my title are not being directed toward Richard Dawkins, one of the two people engaged in this extraordinary conversation. My title is directed toward creationist Wendy Wright. Her obstructionist tactics suggest that it is simply not fruitful to discuss evolution by natural selection with someone who doesn't understand it and doesn't want to understand it.
I've pasted Part 2 of 7 of this exchange above. The other parts are available at Youtube. Richard Dawkins is a model of patience here. Ms. Wright repeatedly invokes a handful of tactics to stretch out this ostensible conversation endlessly. One tactic is to change the topic whenever Dawkins tries to focus upon real world facts. Another is to send out broad accusations, such as accusing Darwin of racism when, in reality, the Victorian world was filled with people who held views that would now be considered racist and, in fact, Darwin and his writings were notably not racist. In fact, Darwin expressed abolitionist views.
In a recent comment I wrote the following:
I’m tempted to begin a new “policy” from today forward. Those disparaging the scientific theory of evolution by natural selection must, in order to deserve a reply (other than a copy and paste of this comment) must, in their own words, describe the basic elements of the theory and at least a few of the many types of evidence supporting the theory. They must also make it clear that they know how a scientific theory differs from pure speculation.
It is my repeated impression that those attempting to criticize the facts and theory of evolution by natural selection are actually attacking some something else, something that biologists, geo-biologists, geneticists, botanists and other scientists do not support. In short, they are attacking straw men. The only reasonable reply to such attacks is to direct the commenter to set aside a few hours and to read a good book on natural selection.
There's a lot more discussion about this video a website with a most extraordinary name: WhyWontGodHealAmputee.com. Soricidae's Blog offers a play by play for one section of the Wright-Dawkins exchange.
Assume that Frans De Waal is correct when he writes that empathy is the foundation of morality, in that it wells up from deep in our bones and that it evolved over many years in our ancestors. What, then, are the functions of the moral rules and moral maxims (and yes, Commandments) that we hear every hour of every day? If these rules aren't the wellspring of our inclinations to be kind and decent (and sometimes violent), what function do they serve? After all, it certainly seems that we are oftentimes guided by our moral rules, even if those rules don't account for that deep empathy that fuels our conduct.
Philosopher of cognitive science Andy Clark considered this issue in a chapter titled "Connectionism, Moral Cognition, and Collaborative Problem Solving," found in an excellent anthology titled Mind and Morals, (edited by Larry May, Marilyn Friedman and Andy Clark (1996). This anthology, based on a conference that occurred at Washington University, explores the interconnections between moral philosophy and cognitive science.
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