What is Republican morality? Such a provocative question! Before we get to an answer, though, what is morality? Jonathan Haidt has much to say about this in this 2008 Edge article. I have often mentioned Haidt in my posts.  I find him to be a first rate thinker and writer.   Now, back to the topic of morality. Here’s how Haidt defines morality:

Morality is any system of interlocking values, practices, institutions, and psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible. It turns out that human societies have found several radically different approaches to suppressing selfishness.

The first thing he teaches, then, is that “morality” is not an “it.” Rather, it is a set of (potentially conflicting) approaches that all aim for the same end: “making social life possible.”

Haidt sets forth the sort of society that passes as “moral” for many of us:

First, imagine society as a social contract invented for our mutual benefit. All individuals are equal, and all should be left as free as possible to move, develop talents, and form relationships as they please. The patron saint of a contractual society is John Stuart Mill, who wrote (in On Liberty) that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.” Mill’s vision appeals to many liberals and libertarians; a Millian society at its best would be a peaceful, open, and creative place where diverse individuals respect each other’s rights and band together voluntarily (as in Obama’s calls for “unity”) to help those in need or to change the laws for the common good.

Psychologists have done extensive research on the moral mechanisms that are presupposed in a Millian society, and there are two that appear to be partly innate. First, people in all cultures are emotionally responsive to suffering and harm, particularly violent harm, and so nearly all cultures have norms or laws to protect individuals and to encourage care for the most vulnerable. Second, people in all cultures are emotionally responsive to issues of fairness and reciprocity, which often expand into notions of rights and justice. Philosophical efforts to justify liberal democracies and egalitarian social contracts invariably rely heavily on intuitions about fairness and reciprocity.

I’ll call this Society #1.  Now consider a different social arrangement, Society #2:

But now imagine society not as an agreement among individuals but as something that emerged organically over time as people found ways of living together, binding themselves to each other, suppressing each other’s selfishness, and punishing the deviants and free-riders who eternally threaten to undermine cooperative groups. The basic social unit is not the individual, it is the hierarchically structured family, which serves as a model for other institutions. Individuals in such societies are born into strong and constraining relationships that profoundly limit their autonomy. The patron saint of this more binding moral system is the sociologist Emile Durkheim, who warned of the dangers of anomie (normlessness), and wrote, in 1897, that “Man cannot become attached to higher aims and submit to a rule if he sees nothing above him to which he belongs. To free himself from all social pressure is to abandon himself and demoralize him.” A Durkheimian society at its best would be a stable network composed of many nested and overlapping groups that socialize, reshape, and care for individuals who, if left to their own devices, would pursue shallow, carnal, and selfish pleasures. A Durkheimian society would value self-control over self-expression, duty over rights, and loyalty to one’s groups over concerns for outgroups.

Society #2 is structured by much more than the principles found in Society #1 (harm/care and fairness/reciprocity). In fact, Haidt has observed that they are structured by three additional principles:

Ingroup/loyalty (involving mechanisms that evolved during the long human history of tribalism), authority/respect (involving ancient primate mechanisms for managing social rank, tempered by the obligation of superiors to protect and provide for subordinates), and purity/sanctity (a relatively new part of the moral mind, related to the evolution of disgust, that makes us see carnality as degrading and renunciation as noble). These three systems support moralities that bind people into intensely interdependent groups that work together to reach common goals.

The net result is that we have two major cultures clashing within the same set of borders:

Republicans have become the party of the sacred, appropriating not just the issues of God, faith, and religion, but also the sacred symbols of the nation such as the Flag and the military. The Democrats, in the process, have become the party of the profane—of secular life and material interests. Democrats often seem to think of voters as consumers; they rely on polls to choose a set of policy positions that will convince 51% of the electorate to buy. Most Democrats don’t understand that politics is more like religion than it is like shopping.

Haidt’s analysis demonstrates why conservatives are so ready to embrace religion and to conflate it with government:

Religion and political leadership are so intertwined across eras and cultures because they are about the same thing: performing the miracle of converting unrelated individuals into a group.

Haidt also explains why liberals are so often portrayed as immoral by conservatives, no matter how much they strive for equality or relief of suffering among the poor, sick and unemployed.

[Ingroup, authority, and purity] play a crucial role in most religions. When they are banished entirely from political life, what remains is a nation of individuals striving to maximize utility while respecting the rules. What remains is a cold but fair social contract, which can easily degenerate into a nation of shoppers.

Haidt notes that the use of “God” to knit the social fabric is sufficient but not necessary; the function of the knitting can be accomplished on other ways, if only liberals would take note:

The Democrats could close much of the gap if they simply learned to see society not just as a collection of individuals—each with a panoply of rights–but as an entity in itself, an entity that needs some tending and caring.

He proposes that liberals should expand their notion of the collective and to note that the three bases of morality that conservatives embrace can be appreciated by liberals, if only they would take a deep breath and give them a chance.

The ingroup/loyalty foundation supports virtues of patriotism and self-sacrifice that can lead to dangerous nationalism, but in moderate doses a sense that “we are all one” is a recipe for high social capital and civic well-being . . . The purity/sanctity foundation is used heavily by the Christian right to condemn hedonism and sexual “deviance,” but it can also be harnessed for progressive causes. Sanctity does not have to come from God; the psychology of this system is about overcoming our lower, grasping, carnal selves in order to live in a way that is higher, nobler, and more spiritual. Many liberals criticize the crassness and ugliness that our unrestrained free-market society has created. There is a long tradition of liberal anti-materialism often linked to a reverence for nature. Environmental and animal welfare issues are easily promoted using the language of harm/care, but such appeals might be more effective when supplemented with hints of purity/sanctity.

That takes care of two out of three.  Respect for authority just doesn’t cut it as a basis for morality, not in my book.  But Haidt gives it a try anyway:  “Even as liberal bumper stickers urge us to “question authority” and assert that “dissent is patriotic,” Democrats can ask what needs this foundation serves, and then look for other ways to meet them. The authority foundation is all about maintaining social order.”

Haidt concludes that conservatives seek a way  to bind our nation together.   Haidt warns that these symbols of unity and authority (e.g., the flag and the military) are tools for conservatives, not necessarily ends in themselves.

He concludes by warning liberals that people don’t vote Republican because they are stupid:

The three Durkheimian foundations of ingroup, authority, and purity are powerful tools in that struggle. Until Democrats understand this point, they will be vulnerable to the seductive but false belief that Americans vote for Republicans primarily because they have been duped into doing so.

Haidt’s work invites an experiment you can run if you veer toward liberal.  There are two basic approaches to discussing politics with Republicans.  You can see how productive that conversation is if you get if you treat Republicans as though they were out to destroy America.  Or, you can see what sort of conversation results if you show and awareness and sensitivity toward the tree Durkeimian foundations, working (perhaps working really hard) to adapt those foundations (e.g., rampant consumerism or destruction of the environment as violations purity of purity).  I’ve done it both ways, and I can guarantee that Approach #1 results in a testy non-productive conversation, often a barking match.  Approach #2 will always result in at least a few connections being made, and perhaps a bit of progress.