A plausible scenario for a military collision with Iran involves Iraqi failure to meet benchmarks, followed by accusations of Iranian responsibility for the failure, then by some provocation in Iraq or a terrorist act in the United States blamed on Iran, culminating in a “defensive” U.S. military action against Iran that plunges a lonely America into a spreading and deepening quagmire, eventually ranging across Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Indeed, a mythical historical narrative to justify the case for such a protracted and expanding war is already being articulated. Initially justified by false claims about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the war is now being redefined as the decisive ideological struggle of our time, reminiscent of the earlier collisions with Nazism and Stalinism. In that context, Islamist extremism and A1 Qaeda are presented as the equivalents of the threats posed by Nazi Germany and then Soviet Russia, and 9/11 as the equivalent of the Pearl Harbor attack that precipitated America’s involvement in World War II.

This simplistic and demagogic narrative overlooks the fact that Nazism was based on the military power of the industrially most advanced European state, and that Stalinism was able to mobilize not only the resources of the victorious and militarily powerful Soviet Union but also had worldwide appeal through its Marxist doctrine.

In contrast, most Muslims are not embracing Islamic fundamentalism. Al Qaeda is an isolated Islamist aberration, and most Iraqis are engaged in strife because of the American occupation, which destroyed the Iraqi state, while Iran, though gaining in regional influence, is itself politically divided, economically and militarily weak. To argue that America is already at war in a region with a wider Islamic threat of which Iran is the epicenter is to promote a self-fulfilling prophecy. Practically no country in the world-no country in the world-shares the Manichaean delusions that the administration so passionately articulates. And the result, sad to say, is growing political isolation of and pervasive popular antagonism toward the U.S. global posture.

The full article is in the April 2007 Harpers Magazine, p. 19 (not available online).

Yes, thank you.

Vicki,

ain’t it the truth (wry smirk).

Contrast this with Saddam. He was a street thug who hated most of the people in his country (i.e., Shiites and Kurds). He stole most of Iraq’s wealth to enrich himself and his friends, and to build palaces for himself. Much of his war equipment had been obliterated in the first Gulf War and little had been rebuilt. He had virtually no air force and no navy. He had a big army, but most Iraqi troops were conscripts: forced to hold a rifle but who would surrender at the first opportunity. He had no loyal followers among Kurds and Shiites (more than half the people in his country), and even his support among Sunnis was relatively limited and mostly the result of bribery and filial loyalty, not nationalism. He had the will to conquer his tiny neighbor, Kuwait, but lacked the resources to hold even that small country.

In sum: Hitler was a nationalistic leader with delusions of godhood who very nearly achieved his vision of continental domination; Saddam was a small-time gangster who had the good luck (at least in the short term) of being born above a large pool of oil that he mostly pilfered for his own enrichment.

In what way were these two dictators alike? Well, they were both dictators.